DP13272 Selective Hiring and Welfare Analysis in Labor Market Models
|Author(s):||Christian Merkl, Thijs van Rens|
|Publication Date:||October 2018|
|Keyword(s):||labor market models, optimal unemployment insurance, welfare|
|Programme Areas:||Labour Economics, Monetary Economics and Fluctuations|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13272|
Firms select not only how many, but also which workers to hire. Yet, in most labor market models all workers have the same probability of being hired. We argue that selective hiring crucially affects welfare analysis. We set up a model that is isomorphic to a search model under random hiring but allows for selective hiring. With selective hiring, the positive predictions of the model change very little, but implications for welfare are different for two reasons. First, a hiring externality occurs with random but not with selective hiring. Second, the welfare costs of unemployment are much larger with selective hiring, because unemployment risk is distributed unequally across workers.