DP13458 Disclosure Regulation and Corporate Acquisitions
|Author(s):||Pietro Bonetti, Miguel Duro, Gaizka Ormazabal|
|Publication Date:||January 2019|
|Keyword(s):||Acquisitions, Disclosure regulation, market for corporate control, mergers, Proprietary costs, Takeover laws|
|JEL(s):||G34, G38, K22|
|Programme Areas:||Financial Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13458|
This paper examines the effect of disclosure regulation on the market for corporate control. We study the implementation of a recent European regulation imposing tighter disclosure requirements regarding the financial and ownership information provided by public firms. We find a substantial drop in the number of control acquisitions after the implementation of the regulation, a decrease that is concentrated in countries with more dynamic takeover markets. Consistent with the idea that the disclosure requirements increased acquisition costs, we also observe that, under the new disclosure regime, target (acquirer) stock returns around the acquisition announcement are higher (lower), and toeholds are substantially smaller. Overall, our evidence suggests that tighter disclosure requirements can impose significant acquisition costs on bidders and thus slow down the market for corporate control.