DP13516 A Field Experiment on Labor Market Speeddates for Unemployed Workers

Author(s): Bas van der Klaauw, Lennart Ziegler
Publication Date: February 2019
Keyword(s): active labor market policies, job search behavior, Matching events, randomized experiment, temporary work
JEL(s): C21, C93, J64, J65
Programme Areas: Labour Economics
Link to this Page: cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13516

We conduct a field experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of labor market speeddates where unemployed workers meet temporary employment agencies. Our analysis shows that participation in such events increases immediate job finding by 6-7 percentage points. In the subsequent months, employment effects diminish again, suggesting that vacancies mediated through temporary employment agencies have no long-lasting effect on employment prospects. While the intervention is cost effective for the UI administration, higher labor earnings of treated job seekers do not fully compensate for the decline in benefit payments. Additional survey evidence shows that speeddate participation increases job search motivation and reduces reservation wages.