Author(s):	Giacomo Calzolari, Leonardo Felli, Johannes Koenen, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Konrad O Stahl
Publication Date:	May 2019
Date Revised:	May 2019
Keyword(s):	bargaining power, Buyer-Supplier Contracts, hold-up, Relational Contracts
JEL(s):	D86, L14, L62, O34
Programme Areas:	Industrial Organization
Link to this Page:	cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13750

Based on data from a comprehensive benchmarking study on buyer-supplier relationships in the German automotive industry, we show that more trust in a relationship is associated with higher idiosyncratic investment by suppliers and better part quality|but also with more competition among suppliers. Both associations hold only for parts involving comparatively unsophisticated technology, and disappear for parts involving sophisticated technology. We rationalize all these observations by means of a relational contracting model of repeated procurement with non-contractible, buyer-specific investments. In relationships involving higher trust, buyers are able to induce higher investment and more intense competition among suppliers|but only when the buyer has the bargaining power. This ability disappears when the bargaining power resides with the supplier(s).