DP13809 Empirical evidence on repeated sequential games

Author(s): Riccardo Ghidoni, Sigrid Suetens
Publication Date: June 2019
Keyword(s): Cooperation, Experiment, infinitely repeated game, sequential prisoner's dilemma, Strategic uncertainty
JEL(s): C70, C90, D70
Programme Areas: Public Economics, Industrial Organization
Link to this Page: cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13809

Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium as compared to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that the second mover in a sequential-move game does not face strategic uncertainty. We study in an experiment whether sequentiality has an effect on cooperation rates. We find that with intermediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases cooperation rates by around 40 percentage points, whereas with very low or high incentives to cooperate, cooperation rates are respectively very low or high in both settings.