DP14005 Entry decisions and asymmetric competition between non-profit and for-profit homes in the long-term care market

Author(s):	Iris Grant, Iris Kesternich, Johannes Van Biesebroeck
Publication Date:	September 2019
Date Revised:	April 2020
Keyword(s):	Competition, For-profit, Long-term care, non-profit
JEL(s):	I11, L13, L22, L33
Programme Areas:	Industrial Organization
Link to this Page:	cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=14005

Mostly due to population aging, the demand for long-term care (LTC) services is growing strongly. Historically, non-profit nursing homes dominated the German LTC market, but the recent entry wave was tilted towards for-profit competitors. Using a rich administrative dataset on all LTC facilities in Germany, we examine strategic interaction between these two ownership types in a static entry model. The estimates of competitive effects imply that non-profit and for-profit homes are substitutes, but competition is much stronger within-type, suggesting that they provide differentiated products. For-profit homes in particular act as if they operate in a different market segment, but over time their entry behavior has converged to that of the more established non-profits. Counterfactual simulations of proposed changes in government policy suggest a large impact on the fraction of markets that remain unserved or only served by a single type.