DP14297 International Jurisdiction over Standard-Essential Patents
|Publication Date:||January 2020|
|Date Revised:||January 2020|
|Keyword(s):||Default rules, international jurisdiction, Standard-essential patents|
|JEL(s):||F15, K21, K33, L40, O38|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization, International Trade and Regional Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=14297|
Standards often require the use of patented technologies. Holders of standard-essential patents (SEPs) typically commit to make their patents available on "fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory" (FRAND) terms. National competition authorities increasingly intervene against perceived FRAND violations. But which competition authority should regulate SEPs that affect more than one country? The paper uses a very simple economic framework to assess the impact of three main legal bases for allocating jurisdiction: territoriality, nationality, and cross-border effects. The findings are negative: neither base will implement a jointly efficient outcome, and the relative performance of the bases depends on the particular circumstances at hand.