DP14407 The Political Economy of Status Competition: Sumptuary Laws in Preindustrial Europe
|Author(s):||Desiree Desierto, Mark Koyama|
|Publication Date:||February 2020|
|Keyword(s):||political economy, regulation, rent-seeking, Status competition|
|JEL(s):||D91, K42, N4, N43, Z10|
|Programme Areas:||Economic History|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=14407|
Sumptuary laws that regulated clothing based on social status were an important part of the political economy of premodern states. We introduce a model that rationalizes the use of sumptuary laws by elites to regulate status competition from below. Our model predicts a non-monotonic effect of income - sumptuary legislation initially increases with income, but then falls as income increases further. The initial rise is more likely for states with less extractive institutions, whose ruling elites face greater status threat from the rising commercial class. We test these predictions using a newly collected dataset of country and city-level sumptuary laws.