Author(s):	Elena Carletti, Steven Ongena, Jan-Peter Siedlarek, Giancarlo Spagnolo
Publication Date:	February 2020
Keyword(s):	Antitrust, banks, Merger Control, mergers and acquisitions, regulation
JEL(s):	G21, G34, K21, L40
Programme Areas:	Financial Economics, Industrial Organization
Link to this Page:	cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=14449

The effect of regulations on the banking sector is a key question for financial intermediation. This paper provides evidence that merger control regulation, although not directly targeted at the banking sector, has substantial economic effects on bank mergers. Based on an extensive sample of European countries, we show that target announcement premia increased by up to 16 percentage points for mergers involving control shifts after changes in merger legislation, consistent with a market expectation of increased profitability. These effects go hand-in-hand with a reduction in the propensity for mergers to create banks that are too-big-to-fail in their country.