DP14449 The Impacts of Stricter Merger Legislation on Bank Mergers and Acquisitions: Too-Big-To-Fail and Competition
|Author(s):||Elena Carletti, Steven Ongena, Jan-Peter Siedlarek, Giancarlo Spagnolo|
|Publication Date:||February 2020|
|Keyword(s):||Antitrust, banks, Merger Control, mergers and acquisitions, regulation|
|JEL(s):||G21, G34, K21, L40|
|Programme Areas:||Financial Economics, Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=14449|
The effect of regulations on the banking sector is a key question for financial intermediation. This paper provides evidence that merger control regulation, although not directly targeted at the banking sector, has substantial economic effects on bank mergers. Based on an extensive sample of European countries, we show that target announcement premia increased by up to 16 percentage points for mergers involving control shifts after changes in merger legislation, consistent with a market expectation of increased profitability. These effects go hand-in-hand with a reduction in the propensity for mergers to create banks that are too-big-to-fail in their country.