DP14597 Lobbying for Globalization
|Author(s):||Michael Blanga-Gubbay, Paola Conconi, Mathieu Parenti|
|Publication Date:||April 2020|
|Date Revised:||February 2021|
|Programme Areas:||International Trade and Regional Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=14597|
Using detailed information from lobbying reports filed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, we show that the political economy of free trade agreements (FTAs) is dominated by a few large firms engaged in international trade, which support the ratification of these agreements. We develop a model of endogenous lobbying on FTAs by heterogeneous firms, which can explain why only large pro-FTA firms select into lobbying. The model also delivers predictions on the intensive margin of lobbying. In line with these predictions, we find that larger firms spend more supporting trade agreements, and individual firms spend more supporting FTAs that generate larger gains â?? i.e., larger improvements in their access to foreign consumers and suppliers and smaller increases in domestic competition â?? and that are more likely to be opposed by politicians.