DP14896 Immigration, Occupational Choice and Electoral Rules Theory and Evidence on Dual Ballot Openness
|Author(s):||Matteo Gamalerio, Massimo Morelli, Margherita Negri|
|Publication Date:||June 2020|
|Keyword(s):||Electoral Rules, Immigration, Occupational choice, SPRAR|
|JEL(s):||D72, J24, J61, R23|
|Programme Areas:||Public Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=14896|
Do institutions affect the level of openness of immigration policies? We study theoretically and empirically how different electoral systems affect the reception of refugees, comparing Single Round Plurality with Dual Ballot systems. We focus on mayoral elections at the municipality level. Our model predicts that municipalities that elect the mayor with a Dual Ballot system receive more refugee- related fiscal transfers from the central government and are more likely to host refugees, compared to municipalities that use a Single Round Plurality system. Using data from Italian municipalities and regression discontinuity design, we provide empirical evidence that confirms the predictions of the theoretical model.