DP15333 Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools
|Author(s):||Clare Leaver, Owen Ozier, Pieter Serneels, Andrew Zeitlin|
|Publication Date:||October 2020|
|Keyword(s):||field experiment, incentives, pay-for-performance, selection, teachers|
|JEL(s):||C93, I21, J45, M52, O15|
|Programme Areas:||Labour Economics, Public Economics, Development Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=15333|
This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a pay-for-percentile or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection.