DP15377 Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in the Allocation of Discrete Resources

Author(s): Marek Pycia, M. Utku Ünver
Publication Date: October 2020
JEL(s): C78, D78
Programme Areas: Industrial Organization
Link to this Page: cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=15377

In environments where heterogeneous indivisible resources are being allocated without monetary transfers and each agent has a unit demand, we show that an allocation mechanism is individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient, i.e., it always selects the best outcome with respect to some Arrovian social welfare function if, and only if, the mechanism is group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. Re-interpreting Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in terms of auditability of the mechanism, we further show that these are precisely the mechanisms that are strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and auditable.