DP1600 The Development of the Division of Power among the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament
Author(s): | Annick Laruelle, Mika Widgrén |
Publication Date: | March 1997 |
Keyword(s): | EU, Game Theory, Inter-governmental Conference, Voting Power |
JEL(s): | C71, D71 |
Programme Areas: | International Trade and Regional Economics |
Link to this Page: | cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1600 |
Probabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to asses actors' influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative voting game and uses the EU as an example. We propose a probabilistic reduced extensive form voting game. By subsequent specialization of power indices we are able to quantify, for example, to what extent the development of the decision-making procedures on the EU has changed the division of power among its main organs.