DP1600 The Development of the Division of Power among the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament

Author(s):	Annick Laruelle, Mika Widgrén
Publication Date:	March 1997
Keyword(s):	EU, Game Theory, Inter-governmental Conference, Voting Power
JEL(s):	C71, D71
Programme Areas:	International Trade and Regional Economics
Link to this Page:	cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1600

Probabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to asses actors' influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative voting game and uses the EU as an example. We propose a probabilistic reduced extensive form voting game. By subsequent specialization of power indices we are able to quantify, for example, to what extent the development of the decision-making procedures on the EU has changed the division of power among its main organs.