Discussion paper

DP1600 The Development of the Division of Power among the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament

Probabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to asses actors' influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative voting game and uses the EU as an example. We propose a probabilistic reduced extensive form voting game. By subsequent specialization of power indices we are able to quantify, for example, to what extent the development of the decision-making procedures on the EU has changed the division of power among its main organs.

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Citation

Widgren, M and A Laruelle (1997), ‘DP1600 The Development of the Division of Power among the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1600. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp1600