DP1600 The Development of the Division of Power among the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament
|Author(s):||Annick Laruelle, Mika Widgrén|
|Publication Date:||March 1997|
|Keyword(s):||EU, Game Theory, Inter-governmental Conference, Voting Power|
|Programme Areas:||International Trade and Regional Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1600|
Probabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to asses actors' influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative voting game and uses the EU as an example. We propose a probabilistic reduced extensive form voting game. By subsequent specialization of power indices we are able to quantify, for example, to what extent the development of the decision-making procedures on the EU has changed the division of power among its main organs.