DP16003 Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information
|Author(s):||Patrick W. Schmitz|
|Publication Date:||April 2021|
|Keyword(s):||Control Rights, Incomplete Contracts, Investment incentives, private information, Public Goods|
|JEL(s):||C78, D23, D82, D86, H41, L33|
|Programme Areas:||Organizational Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=16003|
Consider two parties who can make non-contractible investments in the provision of a public good. Who should own the physical assets needed to provide the public good? In the literature it has been argued that the party who values the public good most should be the owner, regardless of the investment technologies. Yet, this result has been derived under the assumption of symmetric information. We show that technology matters when the negotiations over the provision of the public good take place under asymmetric information. If party A has a better investment technology, ownership by party A can be optimal even when party B has a larger expected valuation of the public good.