DP16111 Market Structure, Investment and Technical Efficiencies in Mobile Telecommunications
Author(s): | Jonathan Elliott, Georges V. Houngbonon, Marc Ivaldi, Paul Scott |
Publication Date: | May 2021 |
Date Revised: | July 2021 |
Keyword(s): | Antitrust Policy, Endogenous quality, infrastructure, market structure, Mobile telecommunications, queuing, scale efficiency |
JEL(s): | D21, D22, L13, L40 |
Programme Areas: | Industrial Organization |
Link to this Page: | cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=16111 |
We develop a model of competition in prices and infrastructural investment among mobile network providers. Market shares and service quality (download speed) are simultaneously determined, for demand affects the network load just as delivered quality affects consumer demand. While consolidation typically has adverse impacts on consumer surplus, economies of scale (which we derive from physical principles) push in the other direction, and we find that consumer surplus is maximized at a moderate number of firms, and that the optimal number of firms is higher for lower income consumers. Our modeling framework allows us to quantify the marginal social value of allocating more spectrum to mobile telecommunications, finding it is roughly five times an individual firm's willingness to pay for a marginal unit of spectrum.