DP1645 Sequential Investments and Options to Own
|Author(s):||Georg Nöldeke, Klaus M. Schmidt|
|Publication Date:||May 1997|
|Keyword(s):||Incomplete Contracts, Options and Convertible Securities, Property Rights|
|JEL(s):||D23, G32, L22|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1645|
This paper analyses the investment incentives given by contingent ownership structures that are prevalent in joint ventures. We consider a variation of the standard hold-up problem where two parties make relationship-specific investments sequentially in order to generate a joint surplus in the future. In many interesting cases, including investments in human and in physical capital, the following ownership structure implements first-best investments: one party owns the firm initially, while the other party has the option to buy the firm at a set price at a later date. This result is robust to the possibility of renegotiation and uncertainty.