DP16659 Terms of Engagement: Migration, Dowry, and Love in Indian Marriages
|Author(s):||Andrew Beauchamp, Rossella Calvi, Scott Fulford|
|Publication Date:||October 2021|
|Keyword(s):||Arranged marriage, Child Marriage, directed search, dowry, India, Marriage, Matching, migration|
|Programme Areas:||Development Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=16659|
The Indian marriage market is characterized by extensive female migration, sizable dowries, and the widespread practice of arranged marriage. We develop and estimate a dynamic, general equilibrium, two-sided matching model with non-transferable utility to recover women's and men's preferences over spousal characteristics (such as age and education) and features of their marriage (including migration upon marriage, dowry payments, and women's involvement in the choice of their spouse). In counterfactual simulations, we study how changes in sex-ratios, women's education, and the practice of dowry, arranged marriage, and child marriage affect the equilibrium match and welfare in the marriage market.