DP1797 Why did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective
|Author(s):||Daron Acemoglu, James A Robinson|
|Publication Date:||March 1998|
|Keyword(s):||Democracy, enfranchisement, Growth, Inequality, political commitment, Redistribution, Revolution|
|Programme Areas:||International Macroeconomics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1797|
During the nineteenth century, most Western societies extended voting rights, a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs. We argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by political elites to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution. Political transition, rather than redistribution under existing political institutions, occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers, while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution. Our theory also offers a novel explanation for the Kuznets curve in many Western economies during this period, with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization.