DP1905 Price Competition Between an Expert and a Non-Expert
|Author(s):||Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse|
|Publication Date:||June 1998|
|Keyword(s):||differentiation, Price Competition, Quality, re-entry|
|JEL(s):||D43, L13, L15|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1905|
This paper characterizes price competition between an expert and a non-expert. In contrast with the expert, the non-expert’s repair technology is not always successful. Consumers visit the expert after experiencing an unsuccessful match at the non-expert. This re-entry affects the behaviour of both sellers. For low enough probability of successful repair at the non-expert, all consumers first visit the non-expert, and a ‘timid-pricing’ equilibrium results. If the non-expert’s repair technology performs well enough, it pays for some consumers to disregard the non-expert. They directly go to the expert’s shop, and an ‘aggressive-pricing’ equilibrium results. For intermediate values of the non-expert’s successful repair a ‘mixed-pricing’ equilibrium emerges where the expert randomizes over the monopoly price and some lower price.