Author(s):	Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
Publication Date:	June 1998
Keyword(s):	differentiation, Price Competition, Quality, re-entry
JEL(s):	D43, L13, L15
Programme Areas:	Industrial Organization
Link to this Page:	cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1905

This paper characterizes price competition between an expert and a non-expert. In contrast with the expert, the non-expert?s repair technology is not always successful. Consumers visit the expert after experiencing an unsuccessful match at the non-expert. This re-entry affects the behaviour of both sellers. For low enough probability of successful repair at the non-expert, all consumers first visit the non-expert, and a ?timid-pricing? equilibrium results. If the non-expert?s repair technology performs well enough, it pays for some consumers to disregard the non-expert. They directly go to the expert?s shop, and an ?aggressive-pricing? equilibrium results. For intermediate values of the non-expert?s successful repair a ?mixed-pricing? equilibrium emerges where the expert randomizes over the monopoly price and some lower price.