DP2060 Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard and Bank Monitoring: A Model of the Credit Channel
|Author(s):||Rafael Repullo, Javier Suarez|
|Publication Date:||January 1999|
|Keyword(s):||bank monitoring, Capital Requirements, Credit Markets, interest rate ceilings, Monetary transmission Mechanism|
|JEL(s):||D82, E44, E50|
|Programme Areas:||Financial Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2060|
This paper develops a model of the choice between bank and market finance by entrepreneurial firms that differ in the value of their net worth. The monitoring associated with bank finance ameliorates a moral hazard problem between the entrepreneurs and their lenders. The model is used to analyze the different strands of the credit view of the transmission of monetary policy. In particular, we derive the empirical implications of a broad credit channel, and compare them to those obtained when the model is extended to incorporate some elements of the bank lending channel.