DP2328 Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations

Author(s):	Anne Sibert
Publication Date:	December 1999
Keyword(s):	Central Banks, Collective Decision Making, Reputation
JEL(s):	D71, E50, E58
Programme Areas:	International Macroeconomics
Link to this Page:	cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2328

This paper looks at how the reputation of a monetary policy-making committee is jointly determined with the reputations of its individual members. I ask whether individuals have more or less incentive to gain a reputation for being tough on inflation when they are part of a group. I examine the effect of increased transparency - in the form of publishing the votes of individual members - on individuals' incentives to appear hard nosed. I look at how other institutional features of central banks affect the policy making body's incentive to refrain from inflation.