DP2381 Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory And Evidence
|Author(s):||Timothy J. Besley, Stephen Coate|
|Publication Date:||February 2000|
|Keyword(s):||Elections, Electricity, Regulation|
|JEL(s):||H11, L51, P16|
|Programme Areas:||Public Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2381|
This paper contrasts direct election with political appointment of regulators. When regulators are appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled with other policy issues for which the appointing politicians are responsible. Since regulatory issues are not salient for most voters, regulatory policy outcomes reflect the preferences of party élites and special interests. Direct election of regulators strengthens the power of voters by ensuring the saliency of regulatory issues. Using panel data on regulatory outcomes from US states, we find evidence in favour of the idea that elected states are more pro-consumer in their regulatory policies.