DP2439 Collateral Vs. Project Screening: A Model Of Lazy Banks
|Author(s):||Michael Manove, Atilano Jorge Padilla, Marco Pagano|
|Publication Date:||April 2000|
|Keyword(s):||Banks, collateral, Creditor Rights, screening|
|JEL(s):||D80, G20, K20|
|Programme Areas:||Financial Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2439|
Many economists argue that the primary economic function of banks is to provide cheap credit, and to facilitate this function, they advocate the strict protection and enforcement of creditor rights. But banks can serve another important economic function: through project screening they can reduce the number of project failures and thus mitigate their private and social costs. Strict protection of creditor rights leaves the tradeoff between these two banking functions to the market. In this paper, we show that because of market imperfections in the banking industry, strong creditor protection may lead to market equilibria in which cheap credit is inappropriately emphasized over project screening. Restrictions on collateral requirements and the protection of debtors in bankruptcy proceedings may redress this imbalance and increase credit-market efficiency.