DP2842 The International Lender of Last Resort: How Large is Large Enough?
|Author(s):||Olivier Jeanne, Charles Wyplosz|
|Publication Date:||July 2001|
|Keyword(s):||Asian crisis, bank runs, credit crunch, deposit insurance, dollarization, exchange rate regime, International Monetary Fund, lender of last resort, multiple equilibria|
|JEL(s):||F32, F33, G21|
|Programme Areas:||International Macroeconomics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2842|
This Paper considers how an international lender of last resort can prevent self-fulfilling banking and currency crises in emerging economies. We compare two different arrangements: one in which the international lender of last resort injects international liquidity into financial markets, and one in which its resources are used to back domestic banking safety nets. We argue that these arrangements have very different institutional implications: the first one implies an international lender of last resort with unlimited resources (a global central bank), while the second one could be operated by a limited ?international banking fund?. This fund, however, would have to be closely involved in the supervision of domestic banking systems. Both arrangements would require important changes in the global financial architecture.