DP2911 Information Sharing in Banking: A Collusive Device?
|Author(s):||Thomas Gehrig, Rune Stenbacka|
|Publication Date:||August 2001|
|Keyword(s):||collusion, imperfectly competitive credit markets, information sharing|
|JEL(s):||D82, G21, L15|
|Programme Areas:||Financial Economics, Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2911|
We show that information sharing among banks may serve as a collusive device. An informational sharing agreement is an a-priori commitment to reduce informational asymmetries between banks in future lending. Hence, information sharing tends to increase the intensity of competition in future periods and, thus, reduces the value of informational rents in current competition. We contribute to the existing literature by emphasising that a reduction in informational rents will also reduce the intensity of competition in the current period, thereby reducing competitive pressure in current credit markets. We provide a large class of economic environments, where a ban on information sharing would be strictly welfare enhancing.