DP3134 Information Sharing, Research Co-Ordination and Membership of Research Joint Ventures
|Author(s):||Giorgio Barba Navaretti, Patrizia Bussoli, David Ulph, Georg von Graevenitz|
|Publication Date:||January 2002|
|JEL(s):||F23, L22, O31, O32|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization, International Trade and Regional Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=3134|
This Paper examines which firms from a heterogeneous pool are more likely to join together and form a research joint venture (RJV). It differs from previous contributions as it introduces a set of realistic hypothesis on the characteristics of research co-operation and information sharing. Research paths can be substitute or complementary. This affects the nature of and consequently the gains from co-operation. The model shows that gains from co-operation are likely to be larger in the second case, as the probability of making a discovery is higher. This Paper also assumes that firms do not share information voluntarily if they do not co-operate only when the firms? products are substitute. If the firms? products are complementary there may be gains in sharing information also under non co-operation. This eliminates the gains from co-operation arising from information sharing. If this is the case, RJVs are more likely to be formed between firms producing substitute products. If we combine these two results we have the prediction that firms co-operate in research when they produce substitute products and when they follow complementary research paths. The empirical analysis carried out on a sample of European RJVs confirms and supports this prediction. The model also carefully explores the role of asymmetries in costs between the two firms. It shows that larger initial asymmetries reduce the information-sharing gains from RJV-formation but increase the research co-ordination gains. This result is supported by the empirical analysis, which shows that gains from RJV formation are largest for intermediate levels of asymmetry.