DP3223 The Cost of Heterogeneity in a Monetary Union
|Author(s):||Andrew Hughes Hallett, Diana Weymark|
|Publication Date:||February 2002|
|Keyword(s):||central bank independence, currency union, emu, preference asymmetries, transmission asymmetries|
|Programme Areas:||International Macroeconomics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=3223|
In this Paper, we explore whether heterogeneity among union members could threaten the stability of the EMU. The types of heterogeneity we consider are (1) asymmetries in the transmission of monetary and fiscal policies, and (2) differences in national preferences for price stability, output growth, and income redistribution. Our results show that the costs of membership are cumulative and can be significant for countries whose structure and/or preferences deviate from those underlying the common monetary policy. In part, these costs arise because monetary policy imposed by an independent central bank automatically constrains the use of fiscal policy by national governments.