Discussion paper

DP3311 The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment

This Paper investigates the effectiveness of benefit sanctions in reducing unemployment duration. Data from the Swiss labour market allow making a distinction between the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements and the effect of the actual enforcement of a benefit sanction. We find that both warning and enforcement have a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment. Moreover, the stricter the sanction policy the shorter the duration of unemployment. This can be taken as evidence of a strong ex-ante effect of a strict sanction policy.

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Citation

van Ours, J, J Zweimüller and R Lalive (2002), ‘DP3311 The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3311. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp3311