Author(s):	Espen R Moen
Publication Date:	July 2002
Keyword(s):	directed search, heterogeneous workers, labour market segmentation, unemployment, wage differentials
JEL(s):	D30, D50, J31, J64
Programme Areas:	Labour Economics
Link to this Page:	cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=3471

In this article, I study the effect of worker heterogeneities on wages and unemployment within the context of a directed search model. A worker's productivity in a given firm depends both on their type and on a worker-firm specific component. Firms advertise unconditional wage offers, and hire the most productive workers that show up. The resulting equilibrium is inefficient, as the wage premium paid to high-type workers is too high, and the number of high-type jobs too low compared to the output-maximizing solution. This reduces the welfare of high-type workers. My findings contrast with the findings in the literature on labour market segmentation, where the argument is that the existence of high-type workers forces down wages to low-type workers and thus reduces the welfare of this group.