DP3625 A Theory of Distributional Conflict, Voluntarism and Segregation
|Author(s):||Ignatius J Horstmann, Kimberley Scharf|
|Publication Date:||November 2002|
|Keyword(s):||fiscal federalism, jurisdiction formation, private provision of public goods|
|Programme Areas:||Public Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=3625|
Along with the rise in income inequality in the US, there is evidence of a simultaneous move toward fiscal devolution and increased government reliance on private provision of public goods. This Paper argues that these phenomena are related. We describe a model of jurisdiction and policy formation in which the structure of government provision is endogenous and public good provision levels are determined by a political process that can exploit private motives for voluntary giving. The model predicts that an increase in income inequality leads to decentralization, with local jurisdictions becoming more income-homogeneous than the population as a whole. This reduction in local income heterogeneity, combined with a reduced tax base, results in increased reliance by government on private provision.