DP3850 Optimal Public Policy for Venture Capital Backed Innovation

Author(s):	Christian Keuschnigg
Publication Date:	March 2003
Keyword(s):	double moral hazard, innovation, public policy, venture capital
JEL(s):	D82, G24, H21, H25, H32
Programme Areas:	Public Economics
Link to this Page:	cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=3850

This Paper discusses the role of public policy towards the venture capital industry. The model emphasises four margins: supply of entrepreneurs due to career choice, entry of venture capital funds and search for investment opportunities, simultaneous entrepreneurial effort and managerial advice subject to double moral hazard, and mark-up pricing when the successful firm introduces a new good. The Paper derives an optimal policy that succeeds to implement a first best allocation in decentralized equilibrium. It also considers short- and long-run comparative static and welfare effects of piecemeal reform with regard to the capital gains tax, innovation subsidy, public R&D spending and other policy initiatives.