DP3953 Informative Advertising and Product Differentiation
|Author(s):||Charalambos Christou, Nikolaos Vettas|
|Publication Date:||June 2003|
|Keyword(s):||informative advertising, non-localized competition, product differentiation, random utility|
|JEL(s):||D83, L13, L15|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=3953|
We study informative advertising within a random-utility, non-localized competition model of product differentiation. In a symmetric equilibrium, advertisement is sub-optimal when product differentiation is small, and excessive otherwise. Increasing the number of firms may increase or decrease the market price. We emphasise that quasi-concavity of profits may fail, as firms may prefer a high price deviation, targeting consumers that only become informed about their product (a feature that, while present in earlier models of informative advertising, has not received enough attention). As product differentiation becomes small, a symmetric equilibrium does not exist.