DP4044 Democratic Public Good Provision

Author(s):	John Hassler, Kjetil Storesletten, Fabrizio Zilibotti
Publication Date:	September 2003
Keyword(s):	markov equilibrium, multiple equilibria, political economy, public good, ramsey allocation, taxation
JEL(s):	D72, D78, E62, H21, H41, H53
Programme Areas:	Public Economics
Link to this Page:	cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4044

This Paper analyses an overlapping generation model of public good provision under repeated voting. The public good is financed through age-dependent taxation that distorts human capital investment. Taxes redistribute income both across different skill groups and across generations. We contrast the political equilibria with the Ramsey allocation, and analyse the sources of inefficiency. The political equilibria can feature both under- and over-provision of public good, as well an inefficient life-cycle profile of taxes.