DP4113 A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement with Legal Aid
|Author(s):||Nuno Garoupa, Frank Stephen|
|Publication Date:||November 2003|
|Keyword(s):||legal aid, sanction, self-reporting|
|Programme Areas:||Public Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4113|
The economic literature on enforcement is generally pessimistic concerning the use of legal aid. In this Paper we show that legal aid can be part of optimal law enforcement. The rationale behind our result is that with legal aid, in a system with legal or judicial error, both guilty and innocent individuals are better off because the marginal cost of defense expenditure is reduced. If, on average, legal aid helps the innocent more than the guilty a government seeking to maximize social welfare will want to use it in order to increase deterrence.