DP4229 Implementing Optimal Policy Through Inflation-Forecast Targeting
|Author(s):||Lars E.O. Svensson, Michael Woodford|
|Publication Date:||February 2004|
|Keyword(s):||commitment, discretion, inflation targeting|
|JEL(s):||E42, E52, E58|
|Programme Areas:||International Macroeconomics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4229|
We examine to what extent variants of inflation-forecast targeting can avoid stabilization bias, incorporate history-dependence, and achieve determinacy of equilibrium, so as to reproduce a socially optimal equilibrium. We also evaluate these variants in terms of the transparency of the connection with the ultimate policy goals and the robustness to model perturbations. A suitably designed inflation-forecast targeting rule can achieve the social optimum and at the same time have a more transparent connection to policy goals and be more robust than competing instrument rules.