DP4331 Asymptotic Analysis of Large Auctions
|Author(s):||Gadi Fibich, Arieh Gavious, Aner Sela|
|Publication Date:||March 2004|
|Keyword(s):||asymmetric auctions, asymptotic methods, collusion, large auctions, revenue equivalence, risk-averse bidders|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4331|
We study private-value auctions with a large number of bidders. We calculate approximations of the equilibrium bids and the seller's revenue in first-price auctions regardless of whether the bidders are symmetric or asymmetric, or risk-neutral or risk-averse. Furthermore, we show that first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, or risk-averse bidders, are asymptotically revenue equivalent to wide classes of standard auctions.