DP4331 Asymptotic Analysis of Large Auctions
Author(s): | Gadi Fibich, Arieh Gavious, Aner Sela |
Publication Date: | March 2004 |
Keyword(s): | asymmetric auctions, asymptotic methods, collusion, large auctions, revenue equivalence, risk-averse bidders |
JEL(s): | D44 |
Programme Areas: | Industrial Organization |
Link to this Page: | cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4331 |
We study private-value auctions with a large number of bidders. We calculate approximations of the equilibrium bids and the seller's revenue in first-price auctions regardless of whether the bidders are symmetric or asymmetric, or risk-neutral or risk-averse. Furthermore, we show that first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, or risk-averse bidders, are asymptotically revenue equivalent to wide classes of standard auctions.