DP4736 Public Safety and the Moral Dilemma in the Defense Against Terror
|Author(s):||Raphaël Franck, Arye L. Hillman, Miriam Krausz|
|Publication Date:||November 2004|
|Keyword(s):||counter-terrorism, Defense economics, defensive preemption, international judges, profiling, terror|
|Programme Areas:||Public Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4736|
The economic theory of defense has traditionally described public safety as achieved through investments that deter adversaries. Deterrence is however ineffective, and preemptive defense is required, when a population of intended victims confronts supreme-value suicide terror. A moral dilemma then arises, since preemption may impose collective punishment, while, in the absence of preemption, the population of intended victims is exposed to acts of terror. We consider how a population of intended terror victims confronts the moral dilemma, and compare the threatened population?s response with the public-safety recommendations of external judges who are not personally affected by the threat of terror.