DP5201 Political Selection and the Quality of Government: Evidence from South India
|Author(s):||Timothy J. Besley, Rohini Pande, Vijayendra Rao|
|Publication Date:||August 2005|
|Keyword(s):||decentralization, India, political economy, public provision of private goods|
|JEL(s):||H11, H42, O12, O20|
|Programme Areas:||Public Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=5201|
This paper uses household data from India to examine the economic and social status of village politicians, and how individual and village characteristics affect politician behaviour while in office. Education increases the chances of selection to public office and reduces the odds that a politician uses political power opportunistically. In contrast, land ownership and political connections enable selection but do not affect politician opportunism. At the village level, changes in the identity of the politically dominant group alter the group allocation of resources but not politician opportunism. Improved information flows in the village, however, reduce opportunism and improve resource allocation.