DP5564 Screening Disability Insurance Applications
| Author(s): | Philip de Jong, Maarten Lindeboom, Bas van der Klaauw |
| Publication Date: | March 2006 |
| Keyword(s): | disability insurance, policy evaluation, self-screening, sickness absenteeism |
| JEL(s): | J28, J65 |
| Programme Areas: | Labour Economics |
| Link to this Page: | cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=5564 |
This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits.