DP5622 On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict
|Author(s):||Francesco Caselli, Wilbur John Coleman II|
|Publication Date:||April 2006|
|Keyword(s):||ethnic distance, exploitation|
|JEL(s):||P48, Q34, Z13|
|Programme Areas:||International Macroeconomics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=5622|
We present a theory of ethnic conflict in which coalitions formed along ethnic lines compete for the economy's resources. The role of ethnicity is to enforce coalition membership: in ethnically homogeneous societies members of the losing coalition can defect to the winners at low cost, and this rules out conflict as an equilibrium outcome. We derive a number of implications of the model relating social, political, and economic indicators such as the incidence of conflict, the distance among ethnic groups, group sizes, income inequality, and expropriable resources.