DP5779 Parallel Imports and Price Controls
|Author(s):||Gene M. Grossman, Edwin Lai|
|Publication Date:||August 2006|
|Keyword(s):||intellectual property, pharmaceuticals, reimportation, TRIPs|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization, International Trade and Regional Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=5779|
Price controls create opportunities for international arbitrage. Many have argued that such arbitrage, if tolerated, will undermine intellectual property rights and dull the incentives for investment in research-intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals. We challenge this orthodox view and show, to the contrary, that the pace of innovation often is faster in a world with international exhaustion of intellectual property rights than in one with national exhaustion. The key to our conclusion is to recognize that governments will make different choices of price controls when parallel imports are allowed by their trade partners than they will when they are not.