DP6333 Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans

Author(s):	Kai A. Konrad, Wolfgang Leininger
Publication Date:	June 2007
Keyword(s):	collective action, defence, distributional conflict, free-riding, norms, war
JEL(s):	D72, D74, H11, H41
Programme Areas:	Public Economics
Link to this Page:	cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6333

We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action.