DP6333 Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans
|Author(s):||Kai A. Konrad, Wolfgang Leininger|
|Publication Date:||June 2007|
|Keyword(s):||collective action, defence, distributional conflict, free-riding, norms, war|
|JEL(s):||D72, D74, H11, H41|
|Programme Areas:||Public Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6333|
We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action.