DP6349 Corporate Governance and Collusive Behaviour
|Author(s):||Paolo Buccirossi, Giancarlo Spagnolo|
|Publication Date:||June 2007|
|Keyword(s):||Amnesty, Antitrust, Cartels, CEO compensation, Collusion, Corporate crime, Corporate fraud, Corporate governance, Corporate liability, Corruption, Deterrence, Employee liability, Fines, Immunity, Imprisonment, Indemnification, Judgement proofness, Leniency, Managerial incentives, Optimal sanctions, Rewards, Whistleblowers|
|JEL(s):||G30, K00, L20, L40|
|Programme Areas:||Financial Economics, Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6349|
This chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance and competition, particularly with regard to cartel formation, and discusses how corporate governance and firm agency problems affect optimal law enforcement against cartels, both in terms of sanctions and leniency policies. Many of the conclusions appear applicable, with minor changes, to non-antitrust forms of collusion, such as collusion between auditors and management, and more generally to corporate and organized crime.