DP6349 Corporate Governance and Collusive Behaviour

Author(s):	Paolo Buccirossi, Giancarlo Spagnolo
Publication Date:	June 2007
Keyword(s):	Amnesty, Antitrust, Cartels, CEO compensation, Collusion, Corporate crime, Corporate fraud, Corporate governance, Corporate liability, Corruption, Deterrence, Employee liability, Fines, Immunity, Imprisonment, Indemnification, Judgement proofness, Leniency, Managerial incentives, Optimal sanctions, Rewards, Whistleblowers
JEL(s):	G30, K00, L20, L40
Programme Areas:	Financial Economics, Industrial Organization
Link to this Page:	cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6349

This chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance and competition, particularly with regard to cartel formation, and discusses how corporate governance and firm agency problems affect optimal law enforcement against cartels, both in terms of sanctions and leniency policies. Many of the conclusions appear applicable, with minor changes, to non-antitrust forms of collusion, such as collusion between auditors and management, and more generally to corporate and organized crime.