DP6768 Effective Political Contests
|Author(s):||Todd Kaplan, Aner Sela|
|Publication Date:||April 2008|
|Keyword(s):||All-pay auctions, Contests, Entry costs|
|JEL(s):||D44, O31, O33|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6768|
We study two-stage political contests with private entry costs. We show that these political contests could be ineffective, namely, the chance of low ability candidates participating in the contest might be higher than the chance of high ability candidates participating in the contest (and winning). However, by imposing a costly requirement (fee) on the winner of the contest, one can guarantee that the contest will be effective.