DP7454 How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition?
|Author(s):||Pedro Pita Barros, Joseph A. Clougherty, Jo Seldeslachts|
|Publication Date:||September 2009|
|Keyword(s):||antitrust, deterrence, merger policy|
|JEL(s):||K21, L40, L49|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=7454|
We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.