DP7511 Waiting to imitate: on the dynamic pricing of knowledge
|Author(s):||Emeric Henry, Carlos Ponce|
|Publication Date:||October 2009|
|Keyword(s):||contracting, knowledge trading, Patents, war of attrition|
|JEL(s):||C73, D23, L24, O31, O34|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=7511|
We study the problem of an inventor who brings to the market an innovation that can be legally copied. Imitators may 'enter' the market by copying the innovation at a cost or by buying from the inventor the knowledge necessary to reproduce and use the invention. The possibility of contracting affects the need for patent protection. Our results reveal that: (i) Imitators wait to enter the market and the inventor becomes a temporary monopolist; (ii) The inventor offers contracts which allow resale of the knowledge acquired by the imitators; (iii) As the pool of potential imitators grows large, the inventor may become a permanent monopolist.