DP8021 Round-Robin Tournaments with Effort Constraints
|Author(s):||Eyal Erez, Aner Sela|
|Publication Date:||September 2010|
|Keyword(s):||effort Constraints, Round-Robin Tournaments, Tullock Contests|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=8021|
We study a round-robin tournament with n symmetric players where in each of the n-1 stages each of the players competes against a different player in the Tullock contest. Each player has a limited budget of effort that decreases within the stages proportionally to the effort he exerted in the previous stages. We show that when the prize for winning (value of winning) is equal between the stages, a player's effort is weakly decreasing over the stages. We also show how the contest designer can influence the players' allocation of effort by changing the distribution of prizes between the stages. In particular, we analyze the optimal distribution of prizes over the stages that balance the effort allocation such that a player exerts the same effort over the different stages. In addition, we analyze the distribution of prizes over the stages that maximizes the players' expected total effort.