DP8454 Fund Managers, Career Concerns, and Asset Price Volatility
|Author(s):||Veronica Guerrieri, Péter Kondor|
|Publication Date:||June 2011|
|Keyword(s):||amplification, career concerns, delegated portfolio management|
|JEL(s):||D53, D8, G1|
|Programme Areas:||Financial Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=8454|
We propose a model of delegated portfolio management with career concerns. Investors hire fund managers to invest their capital either in risky bonds or in riskless assets. Some managers have superior information on the default risk. Looking at the past performance, investors update beliefs on their managers and make firing decisions. This leads to career concerns which a¤ect investment decisions, generating a counter-cyclical 'reputational premium.' When default risk is high, the bond?s return is high to compensate uninformed managers for the high risk of being fired. As default risk changes over time, the reputational premium amplifies price volatility.