DP9376 Cooperative Investment, Uncertainty and Access
|Author(s):||Marc Bourreau, Carlo Cambini, Steffen Hoernig|
|Publication Date:||March 2013|
|Keyword(s):||Access Obligations, Co-investment, Networks, Uncertainty|
|JEL(s):||D21, D43, G31, L5, L96|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=9376|
We investigate cooperative investment for the deployment of a new infrastructure, and how it interacts with access obligations and demand uncertainty. Co-investment increases total coverage only if service differentiation and/or cost savings from joint investment, in particular due to high uncertainty, are high. Mandated access reduces incentives for co-investment not only through lower returns but also by the existence of the access option itself. Voluntary access provision increases infrastructure coverage but reduces social welfare by softening competition.